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Introduction 
 
After promising the British public a referendum on whether to stay in the EU, David 
Cameron is currently trying to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership. His 
increasingly Eurosceptical party and a press that is often hostile towards the 
European Union makes the task a particularly challenging one. 
 
In this series of five essays, Frank Vibert, a Senior Visiting Fellow in the Department 
of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, draws on 
his experience as a founder director of the European Policy Forum to analyse the 
five strands of Cameron’s renegotiation strategy. He concludes that – if he succeeds 
- the Prime Minister’s approach may lead member states and Brussels institutions to 
move away from their current strategy of stressing EU citizens’ rights, rather than 
their consent. 
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Executive	summary	
	
Even if the UK’s worries that eurozone members will overrule ‘outs’ are seen as well founded, 
there are several ways in which some form of redress might be provided within EU structures, 
each with different levels of future security. 
Although all EU member states are now looking again at immigration and border controls, and 
the salience of these issues is now very high across the continent, Treaty constraints on the UK’s 
demands are still restrictive. 
Though the EU might be able to reach agreement on its goals in the area of competition, 
institutional tendencies to over-regulate – and business demands for legal certainty in a large 
market – mean that change will still be difficult to realise. 
Cameron has sought to swing some key EU doctrines behind his arguments for reform. At face 
value, making these links enhances the PM’s chances of success. But once again, the issues 
he raises are not as tractable as they may at first appear. 
The climate of populist scepticism about the EU has raised the temperature generated by UK 
demands for extra ‘sovereignty’. UK demands may induce member states and Brussels 
institutions to alter course – or alternatively to hold fast to current strategies of stressing EU 
citizens’ rights, but not their consent. 
 
About the Author 
Frank Vibert is Senior Visiting Fellow in the LSE’s Government Department. He is the founder 
director of the European Policy Forum, and was senior advisor at the World Bank and senior 
fellow at the United Nations University WIDER Institute, Helsinki. His latest books are The New 
Regulatory Space: Reframing Democratic Governance (Elgar 2014), and Democracy and Dissent; 
The Challenge of International Rule Making (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
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Eurozone	‘ins’	and	‘outs’:	can	Cameron	achieve	a	new	
relationship	between	eurozone	members	and	the	rest?	
 
Even if the UK’s worries are seen as well founded, there are several ways in which some form of 
redress might be provided within EU structures, each with different levels of future security.  
 
David Cameron has identified the relationship between euro-ins and euro–outs as one of the four 
areas to be addressed in renegotiating Britain’s relationship with the EU. The chancellor, George 
Osborne, has referred to it as the most important of the four. In very broad terms, Cameron and 
Osborne are concerned about the possible negative effects that decisions taken by eurozone 
members may have on countries outside the single currency. This fear was framed in the Prime 
Minister’s letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in terms of potential 
damage to the principle of the single market. 
In other words, Britain is suggesting that this relationship involves a core interest and principle 
for all EU member states (whether they are Euro ‘ins’ or ‘outs’). Of course, the government’s real 
concern is actually about the position of the City of London – currently far and away the most 
important financial centre in Europe. At the root of Osborne’s fear is the fact that eurozone 
member states now (since November 2014) have a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers 
if they act together as a bloc under the relevant provisions of the Treaties (TEU Art.16 (4)). 
The Lisbon treaty changed the votes needed in the Council of Ministers to win a ‘qualified 
majority vote’ (QMV) decision to require member states comprising at least 65% of the 
population of the Union, plus 55% of all the member states (i.e at least 15). Weighting by 
population benefited Germany, France and Italy (in the eurozone), albeit the UK as well. The 19 
eurozone states now control 66% of the QMV votes and thus meet both thresholds. In theory, this 
means that neither the UK alone, nor even the UK acting in combination with other non-members 
of the eurozone (such as Poland), can now stop measures that are uniformly supported by 
eurozone members. 
Britain outvoted – is it a real fear? 
But how likely is it that all the eurozone states will act in such a concerted way? Many observers 
feel that the British worry is greatly overblown. All members of the Union have an interest in the 
success of London as far and away Europe’s largest financial centre. Many have a substantial 
stake in the London market through the presence there of their own major banks and financial 
institutions. And of course the eurozone itself has some prominent cleavages between member 
states – for instance, between its ‘northern’ and southern countries, and between those doing 
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well under past austerity policies (like Germany) and those subject to their full impact (like 
Greece). So in any case members of the eurozone may not act as the totally unified bloc needed 
if they were to automatically or reliably predominate in QMV decision-making. 
The other side of the coin is the recognition, both inside and outside the eurozone, that if the 
euro is to consolidate its role in Europe and as an international currency, much further policy 
development is required. Current policy proposals include ‘mutualisation’ through debt write-
offs, or issuing joint euro bills or euro bonds. Other fiscal proposals include tax harmonisation 
and new EU taxes. Some of these ideas will not command a majority within the eurozone states. 
But a large element of unpredictability remains, combined with a sense that ‘something must be 
done’ to strengthen the euro. Safeguarding and developing the euro’s future certainly cannot all 
be left to the European Central Bank (the ECB). 
Adding to the general unpredictability is the ongoing debate about financial regulation in the 
EU. Many financial market observers feel that the policy balance has gone too far towards a 
precautionary stance, and that the measures agreed in the wake of the 2008 crisis should be 
reviewed – but perhaps they would say that anyway. At the same time, the debate about the 
future structure of banking in the EU is far from over. In addition, there are ongoing weaknesses 
in the balance sheets of many EU banks that need to be addressed, for example, about the 
assessment of non-performing loans. 
A number of lines of defence are potentially available to the UK and other non-members of the 
eurozone. One is to gain a permanent, legally enshrined recognition that the Single Market 
operates on the basis of more than one currency. Currently, economic policy provisions in the 
Treaty are framed only in terms of a single currency – the euro (TEU Art.3 and TFEU Article 119 
(paragraph 2)). A second approach is to get agreement that heads off the costs to non-members 
of any financial rescue in the eurozone, particularly in the form of new lending to over-indebted 
members. A third option would be for the euro-ins to agree that they will forbear to use the 
‘necessary powers’ provision of the single currency area (TFEU Art.133), which non- members 
might feel could be misused. However, the key line of defence concerns voting, and the need for 
non-members to protect themselves from being outvoted in the Council of Ministers. 
Voting in the Council 
Voting behaviour in the Council is notoriously difficult to analyse. Votes are rarely taken 
because deals are negotiated beforehand – unless the member state wishes to make a point to its 
own public. Behind the scenes there are two different strategic games being played out. One is 
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between member states themselves, where two or three shifting alliances are involved most of 
the time. The other is between the major Brussels institutions – the Council of Ministers, the 
Parliament (EP) and the Commission. For example, the Commission has the right of initiative on 
new policy proposals, but it will normally carefully weigh the existence and mood of the 
integrationist majority in the EP and assess the chances of achieving a qualified majority vote in 
the Council, before bringing new ideas forward. 
In order to deal with the uncertainties of strategic behaviour for the long term, the most secure 
form of protection would be for member states outside the eurozone to insist on a ‘dual majority’ 
for any proposal that they fear may have negative impact on themselves. What this would mean 
is that, if a qualified majority is reached by eurozone members alone under QMV, a second 
majority would still have to be obtained from the 9 member states outside it. If this second 
majority were aligned to fit with the 55% of members threshold, five out of the nine would have 
to agree, and to meet the 65% of population QMV limit, the opposition of the UK alone would be 
sufficient to block the proposal. 
A weaker form of defence for eurozone non-members would take the form of the so-called 
‘Ioannina’ compromise. Under this procedure any measure perceived by any member of the 
euro-outs to have negative effects would be referred to Heads of States, or heads of 
governments, who would try to reach a decision by consensus. 
 Legal form, legal effects and trust 
Each of the possible lines of protection outlined above could be put into effect through different 
forms of agreement. In ascending order of ‘hardness’ and long-run security for the UK 
agreements could be 
• between members of the European Council, or 
• between the institutions (Council, Commission and EP), or 
• by a Protocol attached to the Treaties, or 
• by changes to the internal provisions of the Treaties. 
The differences here are in the degrees of protection these alternatives offer. For example, an 
agreement in the European Council to adopt the Ioannina compromise procedure might 
succumb to the pressure of later events. And any Council agreement by itself might be 
challenged by the other institutions, including the EU’s ‘supreme court’, the European Court of 
Justice. 
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No matter what the form of agreement is reached between eurozone member states and outside 
EU states, uncertainties will still arise from divergent interpretations about whether or not the 
effect of measures adopted in the eurozone have a negative effect on other states or not. Even 
Treaty change protections may not be fully watertight. The euro-ins could still develop self-
regarding policies under the arrangements for ‘enhanced cooperation’ (TEU Art. 20). They could 
also reach agreements amongst themselves outside the Treaty framework. 
Divergent interpretations of the impact of eurozone measures on other states are a particular 
concern. Under current arrangements any disputes are referred to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). However, the ECJ may not be seen as a neutral arbiter, since opponents argue that it has a 
pro-integrationist majority. An alternative would be for euro-in and euro-out states to establish 
some kind of dedicated arbitration panel whose decisions on disputes between them would be 
final. 
Ultimately the choice of legal form boils down to a question of trust. Game theorists say that trust 
is formed by experience with repeated interactions. No doubt some or many of the eurozone 
insider states will feel that their experience of past interactions with the UK makes them 
pessimistic about giving it any extra blocking power under a system of dual majority voting. 
They may fear that the UK will misuse the new provisions. Conversely, the UK might feel that its 
experience with euro-ins is that it cannot trust them not to take measures that could damage the 
City of London’s position. Here it is the gap in trust that is the issue – the choice of words and 
routes to agreement is secondary. 
9 
	 	
Immigration:	EU	attitudes	are	more	fluid,	but	
substantial	barriers	to	change	remain	
Although all EU member states are now looking again at immigration and border controls, and the 
salience of these issues is now very high across the continent, Treaty constraints on the UK’s 
demands are still restrictive. 
With a few recent polls showing a narrow UK majority for leaving the EU, there is no doubt that in 
raw political terms the need to ‘do something’ about immigration from within the EU is the 
number one priority for Cameron and Osborne. Economists debate the costs and benefits of 
immigration – with different answers of course. But what makes immigration so salient is politics, 
not economics. It is probably the single most important issue for motivating voters who favour 
exit. 
David Cameron’s letter to the President of the European Council refers to estimates that the UK is 
on track to become the most populous country in the EU by 2050. This means that, even when the 
present period of budget ‘austerity’ comes to an end, there will be ever-continuing pressure on 
future budgets to help fund critical infrastructure, schools, health services, other social services, 
housing and transport. Public concern about immigration may be emotive in many aspects of 
how it is expressed – but it is not irrational. 
 
The debate about immigration in the EU is changing fast in reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis 
and terrorism. Moreover it is not simply about security at the external borders of the EU. The 
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issue is also concerns the movement of immigrants within the Schengen group of EU member 
states, who have been experimenting with ‘borderless’ travel.  UK government demands to be 
able to control the flow of immigrants into the UK, and to make the Britain a less attractive 
destination by denying access to welfare benefits, are thus being pitched into a fluid debate 
where all the EU’s member states realize that they have a problem. Every country is now equally 
aware that failure to respond to the problem will further stimulate a very negative political and 
public opinion response. 
Maintaining treaty principles 
Despite the newly increased fluidity and urgency of the issue, the British government still faces 
an uphill battle in negotiating restrictions on flows of EU citizens (and refugees) into the UK. The 
reason is that the problem from Britain’s perspective is not mainly about immigration from 
outside the EU, it is about immigrant flows within – from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and, in the 
more distant future, from prospective new member states such as Serbia, or Albania, or Ukraine. 
And here the UK government runs up against those provisions in the EU Treaty base on the 
Single Market that establish the principles of 
• non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (TFEU Article 18) 
• the right to move and reside (TFEU Articles 20 and 21) and 
• the freedom of movement provisions of TFEU Article 26. 
Of similar importance to the general principles of non-discrimination and free movement are 
those Treaty articles referring specifically to 
• the freedom of movement of workers and 
• non-discrimination against workers from other EU member states (TFEU Article 46). 
In addition there is the further stipulation (in TFEU Article 48)  that EU measures in the field of 
social security should provide for freedom of movement for workers. 
Notwithstanding the many current stresses in the Schengen area, other EU member states have 
made clear that they wish to maintain the freedom of movement  principles of the Single Market. 
The UK government thus has to show that the restrictions it is demanding can take a form that will 
leave these general principles still intact. 
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Derogations 
The treaty base of the EU offers a time-honoured way for squaring these kinds of circles. It takes 
the form of derogations, that is, exceptions to whatever the general principle lays down.  For 
example, TFEU Article 48 on the provision of social security benefits to workers from other EU 
states already refers to a special procedure relating to any EU measures in the field that would 
impact the social security budget of a member state and would affect ‘important aspects of its 
social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure’. (TFEU Article 48 
paragraph (b)). 
Another kind of derogation, relating to the different principle of the freedom of movement of 
capital, is the ‘step-back’ procedure. In this particular example, the Council is able to take a step 
backwards in Union law from the general principle regarding the liberalization of the movement 
of capital to or from third countries. (TFEU Article 64 paragraph 3). 
So the UK government will have some precedents that it can cite, either in looking for ways to 
restrict claims on social security by workers coming from other EU member states, or possibly, 
to ‘step back’ from the freedom of movement and right of abode provisions more generally. 
Legal challenge and human rights 
In thinking about the legal protections the UK might win, there is a further dimension that 
distinguishes the negotiations over immigration from other aspects of the negotiation – such as 
the relationship between euro ins and euro outs (discussed in the first chapter). In the case of 
any economic or financial disputes with the eurozone any quarrel lies between governments – or 
possibly with official institutions such as the ECB. In the case of immigration the possible 
challenges to any protections gained by the UK may come not only from other member states 
(for example, the Polish or Romanian government) but also from individual workers pursuing 
legal cases, or from NGOs or lawyers representing them. 
If such legal challenges do emerge from non-governmental sources they make take the form of 
cases brought under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (agreed in 2000 and adapted in 
2007). According to the Treaty (TEU Article 6) these provisions have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. The Charter does not create new rights not already in the Treaties. It does however 
reaffirm the freedom of movement and right of abode provisions of the Treaty (in Article 45), the 
right to engage in work (Article 15) and the right to social security benefits (Article 34). 
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Under a special Protocol agreed under the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK (and Poland) negotiated an 
exemption to the application of the Charter ‘except insofar as Poland or the UK has provided for 
such rights in its national law’. (Protocol Article 1, paragraph 2). However, the UK’s Human Rights 
Act prohibits discrimination based on national origin (Article 14). Thus, the Protocol itself, and 
the exception it provides, both open up potentially fertile avenues for legal challenges. In 
negotiating derogations or ‘step-back’ procedures the UK government will therefore have to 
take a further look at the Protocol, and at its own human rights legislation. 
The danger for the UK government is that it may negotiate derogation or step-back procedures 
that appear to provide it with protection from immigrant flows into the UK from other EU states – 
only to find that these protections then come under immediate challenge from the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Such a confused outcome will only add to the incentives for those groups 
who want Britain to vote for exit. 
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Competition:	why	cutting	regulation	is	so	hard	for	the	
EU	
Though the EU might be able to reach agreement on its goals in this area, institutional tendencies to 
over-regulate – and business demands for legal certainty in a large market – mean that change will 
still be difficult to realise. 
When the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, intervened in the debate about British 
membership in the EU, he stressed the dynamic benefits conferred by the single market on the 
British economy. Unfortunately, although the single market is a very large one, it is not dynamic. 
Other markets outside the EU – such as the US, India and China -have been growing much faster. 
Even with the slowdown in world trade, and in China more specifically, non-EU markets offer 
more dynamic growth prospects. 
It is the need to revive the dynamism of the single market that the British government is trying to 
address by identifying ‘competitiveness’ as one of its four key negotiating aims. 
Competitiveness differs from the other three British negotiating aims, in the sense that in this 
case the UK is pushing at an open door rather than having to overcome a general reluctance or 
resistance. All the member states are concerned about Europe’s poor economic prospects, its 
high unemployment levels and particularly serious youth unemployment levels. 
In his now-famous letter to EU president Donald Tusk, Cameron’s proposals on competitiveness 
included a number of references to specific policies in the single market, including the need to 
bring capital markets closer together. ‘Capital markets union’ plays to the hope that businesses 
in the EU can turn more to equity financing to meet their needs and become less dependent on 
bank financing. The pattern of corporate funding in the EU would thus become more similar to 
that in the USA. Start-up companies would be among the intended beneficiaries of such a shift. 
Regulatory techniques and drivers 
The main thrust of the PM’s letter is, however, about the costs of doing business in the EU. Here 
the UK government’s key target for change is the need to lower regulatory burdens. This means 
finding ways to reduce the existing stock of regulation and to minimise new regulatory burdens 
arising from fresh EU legislation. 
Over the past 20-25 years, the European Commission has embedded in its working practices all 
the techniques of regulatory scrutiny that are to be found in developed markets worldwide. 
Cost/ benefit analysis, tests of necessity and proportionality, mechanisms for regulatory 
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oversight and evaluation are all to be found in Commission practices. It has introduced the usual 
mantras of ‘better regulation’ or ‘smart’ regulation into its lexicon and has carried out various 
exercises to simplify and to reduce the size of the existing rule book for doing business in the 
EU. No doubt technical improvements are still possible. But the core of the problem is not about 
the techniques of regulatory practice. It is about the underlying drivers behind the urge to 
legislate and to regulate. 
If the British government is to return from the negotiating table with a convincing story to tell 
Conservative and Ukip voters – at least on reducing the costs of doing business in the EU – it has 
to offer more than Commission promises on how to carry out ‘better regulation’. Cameron and 
George Osborne have to be able to say how they have blunted the underlying drivers behind 
the EU’s compulsion to regulate. There are two different types of driver. One centres on the 
institutional incentives to regulate. The other involves the quest for legal certainty in the single 
market, popularised in such expressions as the need for ‘a level playing field’ and a uniform 
compliance that avoids ‘gold plating’ at one end, and avoidance at the other. 
Institutional incentives 
What lies behind the EU’s urge to regulate? Public choice theorists focus their attention on the 
institutional incentives involved, especially as they relate to the jewel in the crown of the 
European Commission’s powers – which is its right of initiative in all legislation. Take this away 
and the Commission becomes like any other bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the jewel in the European 
Parliament’s crown is its right of co-decision on new legislation, shared with the Council of 
Ministers. Take this away, and the Parliament becomes a mere talking shop. 
Put in another way, according to a public choice view, the raison d’être of the 28 members of the 
European Commission (and their staffs) is to come up with new proposals for EU action. The 
raison d’être of the integrationist majority in the EP is to co-legislate new measures. Neither have 
any self-interest in legislative or regulatory restraint. Nor do they have a particular interest in 
spending time and attention on ways to reduce the stock of existing regulation. 
If this view of institutional incentives is correct, it will not be possible for British negotiators to 
address the problem head-on, even if they wanted to. At best it might be possible to negotiate an 
Inter-Institutional Agreement that all future measures that add to the costs of doing business in 
the EU should come with ‘sunset’ clauses attached – so that they will expire automatically. 
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The more radical alternative, from a public choice perspective, is to bypass the Brussels 
incentive system and to turn to national parliaments to keep regulations in check. For example, a 
largish minority of national parliaments might be able to propose deletions to the existing rule 
book, and also be able to block new measures that would increase the costs of doing business. 
Possibly actions to propose deletions could be agreed by the European Council on the basis of a 
simple majority of member states. The PM’s letter refers to a ‘red card’ role for national 
parliaments in the context of ‘sovereignty’. Such a red card system might also have an 
application in relation to the costs of doing business. 
 
Volkswagen vehicle emissions … a failure of EU law and regulation to assure certainty in the 
single market 
Honesty and legal certainty 
The quest for legal certainty is not about public choice. It is about private choice, and in 
particular about the desires of private business. The business attitude towards regulation is two 
faced. Businesses deplore it – but they are often supporters of it. 
Economists often fail to point out that markets do not work unless there is honesty and an 
absence of intent to defraud in contracts and pricing – the twin pillars of any market system. 
We can decide on the honesty of a trader in a market with repeated face-to-face contact. In any 
large market that involves distant relationships, such as the EU’s single market, we rely on the 
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law to uphold contracts and to punish dishonesty. Adam Smith referred to ‘emotional distance’ as 
the reason for law. 
In the case of the single market, EU law provides an attractive way of introducing legal certainty 
into commercial and business relationships. Otherwise businesses have to make their own 
judgments on the possibilities and timeliness of redress under, for example, Bulgarian or Italian 
law. Despite well-noted differences in what is euphemistically called ‘compliance culture’ (due 
to non-enforcement in some locations) the demand by businesses for a level playing field is a 
frequently recurring refrain. 
Unfortunately, in the case of VW emissions standards, it has become all too apparent that EU law 
and regulation does not assure honesty in the single market. The British government could 
therefore use the opportunity to open up a different kind of debate on how to improve standards 
that does not involve ever-increasing recourse to EU law. 
The alternative to ever-greater reliance on EU law involves efforts by national authorities on two 
fronts. Emphasising the importance of business ethics is a first strategy. A second might be 
bringing civil and criminal prosecutions against those who transgress. It is unfortunate for 
Cameron and Osborne that the UK’s own record is poor on both these counts. It has never been 
clear what ethical standards are included under the ‘fit and proper persons’ test applied to 
company boardroom appointments by the Business and Innovation department on behalf of the 
UK government. Equally, as the cases of Northern Rock, HBOS and RBS in the 2008 financial crisis 
all demonstrate, there has also been a great reluctance by UK authorities to prosecute business 
wrongdoing. 
Yet leaving aside the less than stellar performance of the British government, it might be 
possible for the member states in the European Council to agree that they will each be more 
active in promoting codes of ethics and in prosecuting wrongdoing in their own markets. They 
might start with VW. 
The fact that for once the British push on competitiveness faces an open door in terms of other EU 
states’ reactions will be refreshing for the UK government. The difficulty is that it is not clear how 
far this general receptiveness translates into a willingness to look at the fundamental drivers 
behind EU regulation – either the institutional drivers, or the quest for legal certainty. The door is 
open; the cupboard may be bare. 
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Subsidiarity:	can	Cameron	secure	reform	without	treaty	
change?	
Cameron has sought to swing some key EU doctrines behind his arguments for reform. At face 
value, making these links enhances the PM’s chances of success. But once again, the issues he raises 
are not as tractable as they may at first appear. 
David Cameron’s now famous (or notorious) letter to EU President Donald Tusk makes specific 
reference to the EU doctrine of subsidiarity (see the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) article 
5) and to Dutch government proposals on enhancing subsidiarity, ‘Europe Where Necessary, 
National Where Possible’. 
In fact, these references allude to three different issues.  The first is about how agenda setting 
currently operates within the EU machine.  The Dutch would like an assurance that certain policy 
areas will be kept off the EU’s agenda and reserved to the member states. For example, the 
Netherlands suggests that policies in respect of direct taxation and criminal law procedures 
should be defined as off the agenda for the EU. 
The institutions might reach a political agreement on policy priorities here. However, there is 
also an underlying institutional question about who sets those priorities. The European Council’s 
function is to define priorities (see TEU Article 15), but this sits uneasily with the European 
Commission’s right to initiate policy proposals (TEU Article 17). The Netherlands suggest that 
the Commission should refrain from carrying forward any proposals where there is a widely 
shared objection in the Council on grounds of subsidiarity. 
A second question arises because the current subsidiarity provision is ineffective as a means of 
protecting member states from overreaching measures from the EU. In the eyes of its critics, it 
receives ritual acknowledgment from institutions such as the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice (the EU’s ‘supreme court’), but it has little practical effect. Supported by the UK 
in Cameron’s letter, the Netherlands suggests that the principle should be interpreted in terms 
of EU measures ‘only when necessary’, rather in the existing terms of when it might be ‘better’ 
for the EU to act (TEU Article 5, paragraph 3). 
The third aspect of subsidiarity concerns a related weakness in the principle of conferral (TEU 
article 5, paragraph 2) that is also meant to protect the prerogatives of member states. Again, in 
the eyes of critics, the principle has little practical impact. The Treaty base offers many different 
pegs on which to hang initiatives. So if one basis appears problematic, the Commission and or 
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Parliament can always turn to another. The Netherlands proposals emphasise the need for a 
clear legal base before joint EU action is proposed. Taken individually and together, these areas 
raise rather fundamental questions about the distribution and exercise of powers in the EU. 
However, the Netherlands government suggest they can be addressed without Treaty change. 
 
The lobby of the European Court of Justice.  
Constitutional interpretation and ‘ever closer union’ 
A fundamental question also underlies the PM’s request that the Treaty reference to ‘ever closer 
union’ (in TEU article 1) no longer apply to the UK. The underlying issue here is about the 
judicial philosophy followed by the ECJ in its interpretations of the Treaty base. This is usually 
referred to as a philosophy of ‘integration through the law’. 
For some observers, this philosophy is exactly as it should be in a Union of states based on the 
idea of the rule of law. For others, it is a normative philosophy that means that the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) will always in its judgments lean towards the Union rather than towards 
member states. According to this view, the effect of applying this provision is that the ECJ cannot 
be a ‘neutral’ arbiter of the powers in the Treaty.  So the Netherlands proposals suggest a 
procedure under which the European Council (bringing together EU heads of government) can 
go back to amend legislation if there is an unforeseen ruling by the ECJ. However, critics of the 
Court argue that (even if it could be agreed) any such procedure would still leave the judicial 
stance of the Court untouched. 
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Possibly Cameron can receive some form of ‘comfort letter’ from other European Council 
members stating that they accept that the UK does not share the goal of ‘ever closer union’. 
Supporters of the UK leaving the EU will say that such a letter has little or no value in influencing 
the future philosophy applied by the Court. 
Flexibility and the structure of legal pluralism 
Lastly, Cameron’s letter asserts that his entire reform agenda can be summed up in one word – 
‘flexibility’. It also makes specific reference to one of the ‘pillars’ of the European Union, 
previously called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, and now termed Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)) and stressing co-operation in the fight against crime. Here 
the letter expresses concern about the erosion of the national opt-outs and opt-ins that form the 
essential instruments for flexibility. 
The underlying issue here involves what is known as legal pluralism. It is an issue that has 
received considerable recent attention from constitutional lawyers – prompted both by the 
growth of international rule making, and by the need to rethink arrangements for courts in what 
are known as ‘deeply divided’ societies – such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The EU’s Treaty base provides for a form of legal pluralism. Article 67 of the TFEU calls for 
respect for ‘the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States’.  However, the Court 
also has the right to review the legality of the acts of the other institutions, including the Council 
(under TFEU Article 263). Here the ECJ has asserted the supremacy of EU law over member state 
law. This means that should a clash ever occur between the highest court of a member state 
interpreting that state’s constitution (including powers transferred to the EU) and the ECJ over 
the interpretation of the Treaties, the ECJ will assert its superior authority. Rather than put this to 
the test, so far both member state courts and the ECJ itself have tried to avoid direct 
constitutional confrontations. 
An alternative form of legal pluralism involves a principle of mutual deference.  Depending on 
how it is articulated, this could mean that the ECJ would defer to the highest courts of member 
states in the event of constitutional dispute. If flexibility is to become the norm in the EU, as 
Cameron would hope, a stronger form of legal pluralism than is now recognised in the Treaties 
may well be necessary. 
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Sovereignty:	David	Cameron	challenges	the	EU’s	own	
explanation	for	its	unpopularity	
The climate of populist scepticism about the EU has raised the temperature generated by UK 
demands for extra ‘sovereignty’. UK demands may induce member states and Brussels institutions to 
alter course – or alternatively to hold fast to current strategies of stressing EU citizens’ rights, but not 
their consent. 
In recent years there has been an upsurge across Europe of what is usually referred to as 
‘populism’, by which is meant the rise of ‘extreme’ parties – sitting further right or further left 
than the mainstream centre-left/centre-right groupings that have largely dominated European 
politics in the post-war era, and especially since the fall of communism. In the UK, UKIP is often 
seen as a rightwing example of this phenomenon. France has the Front National, and Hungary 
Jobbik.  In Spain, Podemos is often cited as a leftwing example, Greece has Syriza, while Jeremy 
Corbyn’s unexpected rise to lead the Labour party might have a similar explanation. 
In seeking to explain this phenomenon, political scientists often offer an economic rationale. This 
interprets populism as primarily a ‘backlash’ response to the 2008 economic crisis and austerity, 
lower growth expectations for the future and the difficulties faced by ‘blue collar’ workers in 
today’s ‘knowledge’ economy. If the economic ‘explanation’ of populism is correct, then 
European leaders can hope that that these movements and parties will fade as economic 
prospects improve. 
An alternative explanation is more politico-cultural. It holds that the European Union has failed to 
find a political structure that responds to what significant numbers of people want. Partly this is a 
problem of distance – the gulf between the Brussels ‘bubble’ and the everyday concerns of 
ordinary voters. Partly it is a problem of ‘insiders’ versus ‘outsiders’ – the gap between the elites 
who know how to influence the Brussels game and those who feel excluded and out of the loop. A 
key flashpoint for rightwing parties has been concerns over immigration levels and ‘anti-
foreigner’ reactions, discussed in the second chapter. For left populists, it is the EU’s 
involvement in the imposition of harsh austerity conditions on their countries that is key. If the 
political ‘explanation’ is correct then populism is probably here to stay – unless the EU reforms 
its political structures in fairly radical ways. 
Populism, together with the spreading sense that it may represent more than a passing mood, is 
a cause of great unease across the established mainstream parties in Europe. It is not just the 
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British Conservative party’s concern about UKIP. It is this more general sense of unease about 
the structure of politics that provides the backdrop to Cameron’s demands on ‘sovereignty’. 
Brit-centricity and sovereignty 
	
 
West Midlands Ukip campaigners and their battlebus in 2009. 
It seems unfortunate that David Cameron has sought to voice British concerns about the political 
structure of the EU using the peculiarly British terms of ‘sovereignty’. Of course this choice of 
language reflects the British convention that long-standing (but perhaps not now so applicable) 
UK view that the Westminster parliament is sovereign in the broad sense of having the final say 
on all matters of British legislation – including (still) arrangements for regionally devolved and 
local powers in the UK. According to this account, Parliament is the unique source of the powers 
of institutions that have public authority in the UK and of the rights of citizens. 
This is not the view of how power is exercised in the rest of the EU member states. Here, instead, 
written constitutions set out institutional roles and powers, and legislative procedures and rights. 
Often a separate constitutional court rules on matters in dispute between different institutions or 
parties. In the EU itself the treaties between member states act as a form of constitution and the 
Court is responsible for their interpretation (see the Treaty of the EU (TEU) Article 19, paragraph 
1).  The member states thus sit down to consider British demands about sovereignty without a 
shared understanding about what sovereignty itself means. 
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This lack of a common understanding may not stand in the way of agreements on the specific 
items that David Cameron has identified in his letter to Donald Tusk. Under the current ‘yellow 
card’ system national parliaments are simply able to object to proposals from the Commission 
that they dislike (TEU Article 12 and Protocol). The UK now wants national parliaments to be able 
to actually block proposals from the Commission, and this idea may meet with some sympathy. 
Unfortunately for Cameron, however, the instances where British exceptionalism and the 
interests of other member states coincide may be few and far between. 
Consent 
One thing that the Prime Minister’s letter does not explicitly refer to is consent. Yet the concept 
lies behind the whole British negotiation approach. The PM has been forced into the negotiation 
because a significant part of the British electorate no longer consents to the terms of British 
membership. He wishes to show that he can regain that consent with adjusted terms. 
One of the features of modern constitutionalism, including in the EU itself, is that the idea of the 
consent of the people to the constitutional framework and its provisions has been eroded. It has 
been replaced by the inclusion of declarations of rights within a constitution. Rights offer legal 
content and protections with which people can identify. So identification has replaced consent, 
which (in the word of one legal scholar) has now become ‘secondary’. The EU reflects this trend 
to emphasise identification through rights. 
The issue of consent extends beyond one country, in this case the UK, and beyond one occasion. 
Many member states fear that allowing for more expressions of consent by citizens will only lead 
to them rejecting more provisions and policies. 
So the question is whether the EU Treaty base should strengthen the provisions for the exercise 
of consent by citizens within member states. This would involve a much more extensive capacity 
for people to demand referendums, to block the transfer of powers to the EU, and to block the 
exercise of these powers at later implementation stages. 
The art of the possible 
In his letter David Cameron says that the UK is looking to achieve its negotiating objectives in 
forms that are legally binding. The problem for the British government is that it is completely 
unrealistic to expect that all the fundamental questions about the EU’s institutional and judicial 
structure (covered here and in my earlier posts) can be addressed within the necessarily short 
timeframe of the negotiations. At the most, it might be possible for the European Council to 
23 
	 	
agree to set up an expert group to examine the underlying constitutional issues and to prepare 
alternative ways to approach them. 
Over the years, the EU has extended the reach of its policies and institutions through an adroit 
balance between what is visible in the Treaties and what is largely invisible to member states’ 
electorates. For instance, the principle of subsidiarity has been highly visible while the judicial 
doctrine of the supremacy of EU law over national constitutions (unstated in the Treaties) has not. 
The aim of ever closer union has been visible, but not the less visible procedures for trying to 
reach consensus solutions. European citizens’ rights have been visible, but their consent has 
been less visible (except for sporadic and exceptional national referenda on Treaty changes). 
British demands can be interpreted by other member states as a warning about the limits of a 
union conducted on the basis of the invisible – a warning that they should try to respond to if they 
wish to combat populism in their own countries.  Alternatively, British demands can be seen as 
an unwelcome intrusion into a proven recipe for the attainment of increasing levels of mutual 
cooperation, whose spreading benefits will (eventually) lead to populism fading back to 
manageable levels. 
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